d01a358f35
Update PKGBUILD version / update-pkgver (push) Successful in 3s
Three rounds of audit-driven hardening, fully documented in DECISIONS.md: - argv hardening: validate HostName/User/IdentityFile via allowlist regexes, parse Port via strconv.Atoi, surface ssh_config parse errors instead of silently swallowing them. Switch -o kernel_cache to auto_cache for network- FS correctness, pin StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new. - LOW-severity cleanup: -v verbose flag (default output is just the mount path), run_editor returns errors and main exits 7 on failure, ABOUTME headers, golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0 (go 1.25.0). - Defense-in-depth + UX: rxIdentityFile first-character anchor rejects leading "-"/"."/":"/etc., verify_mount_dir resolves base via EvalSymlinks and refuses pre-existing symlinks at the mount path, flag.Usage shows the positional <Host> argument, run_editor uses cmd.Start() so cold-start Sublime does not block the terminal. - CI: empty-PKGVER guard in update-pkgver workflow. - Tests: verify_mount_dir path-traversal + symlink-reject coverage, rxHostUser/rxIdentityFile boundary cases.
79 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
4.8 KiB
Markdown
# Decisions
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## 2026-04-26 – Audit remediation: cache flag, host-key policy, argv hardening
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- **Who**: Dom, ClaudeCode
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- **Why**: Audit found `kernel_cache` causes stale reads on a network FS;
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`StrictHostKeyChecking` was implicit (depended on system default);
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`ssh_config`-sourced strings flowed into the sshfs argv without validation,
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allowing comma- or leading-dash injection if `~/.ssh/config` is attacker-influenced.
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- **Tradeoffs**:
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- `auto_cache` invalidates the page cache on `open(2)` when mtime/size
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differ → marginal perf hit vs. correctness on a network FS.
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- `accept-new` for `StrictHostKeyChecking` preserves first-connection UX
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(TOFU) but locks subsequent reconnects to the recorded key.
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- Allowlist regexes for HostName/User/IdentityFile are restrictive but match
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real-world SSH naming. Rejected inputs surface a clear error.
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- **How**:
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- Replaced `-o kernel_cache` with `-o auto_cache` in `mount_sshfs`.
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- Added explicit `-o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new`.
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- Added `lookup_ssh_field` (uses `GetStrict`, surfaces parse errors) and
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`validate_ssh_field` with per-field allowlists; Port parsed via `strconv.Atoi`.
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- Added `main_test.go` covering `verify_mount_dir` and the allowlist regexes.
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- Hardened `.gitea/workflows/update-pkgver.yaml` with an empty-PKGVER guard.
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## 2026-04-26 – LOW-severity audit findings: cleanup pass + one Won't-Fix
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- **Who**: Dom, ClaudeCode
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- **Why**: Followup on the LOW-severity findings from the same audit.
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- **How**:
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- Q-L1: dead `if len(port) == 0 { port = "22" }` block already removed by Q-M1
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refactor (port now flows through `lookup_ssh_field` → `strconv.Atoi`).
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- Q-L2: `run_editor` returns `error` and `main` exits 7 on editor failure
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instead of swallowing it.
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- Q-L3: ABOUTME header added to `main.go` per global CLAUDE.md convention.
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- P-L1: `golang.org/x/sys` bumped `v0.1.0 → v0.43.0` via `go get … && go mod tidy`.
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`go` directive moved from 1.23.4 to 1.25.0 (required by the new dep).
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- S-L2: added `-v` flag; default output now prints only the mount path.
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`-v` restores the previous full HostName/User/Port/IdentityFile/Mount block.
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- **Won't-Fix**:
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- **S-L1** — `.gitea/workflows/update-pkgver.yaml` clones over
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`http://gitea:3000/...`. This URL only resolves inside the Docker network
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between the Gitea-act-runner container and the Gitea container. External
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traffic still terminates TLS at the reverse proxy. An attacker on the
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internal Docker bridge has already compromised the host; TLS between
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containers does not help in that scenario. Documenting as accepted risk.
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## 2026-04-26 – Second-round audit: defense-in-depth + UX
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- **Who**: Dom, ClaudeCode
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- **Why**: Re-audit (Quality + Performance + Security in parallel) surfaced five
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remaining LOW findings after agent-output gegencheck. Two MEDIUM claims were
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filtered out as false positives: missing `Port` already defaults to `"22"` via
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`ssh_config.Default()` (verified in library source), and `lookup_ssh_field`
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does not parse `~/.ssh/config` four times — `kevinburke/ssh_config` caches via
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`sync.Once`, so four `GetStrict` calls = one parse + three in-memory walks.
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An additional MEDIUM claim about a regex range bug (`%-` interpreted as range)
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was empirically refuted (only `-` matched, not the implied range), but a
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legitimate defense-in-depth gap remained: the regex still allowed leading `-`
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in IdentityFile values.
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- **Tradeoffs**:
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- `run_editor` switched to `cmd.Start()` — drops editor exit-status
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propagation in exchange for non-blocking UX on Sublime cold-start. Errors
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from missing binary or fork failure are still returned.
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- `verify_mount_dir` now `MkdirAll`s the base separately before
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`EvalSymlinks`. `EvalSymlinks` requires the path to exist; without the
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upfront `MkdirAll`, first run on a fresh system would fail.
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- `rxIdentityFile` first-character class restricted to `[A-Za-z0-9/~]`. Plain
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relative paths like `.ssh/id` are rejected — unusual but technically valid
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in `ssh_config`. If a real config uses relative IdentityFile values, the
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user gets a clear error and can switch to absolute or `~`-prefixed.
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- **How**:
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- **S-L1**: anchored `rxIdentityFile` to `^[A-Za-z0-9/~][A-Za-z0-9._@/:+=~%-]*$`.
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- **S-L2**: `verify_mount_dir` resolves base via `filepath.EvalSymlinks` and
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rejects existing mount paths that are symlinks (`os.Lstat`).
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- **Q-L1**: `flag.Usage` override now prints the positional `<Host>` argument
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in the help output.
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- **Q-L2**: inline comment at the `run_editor` call site documents the
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deliberate fall-through on already-mounted hosts.
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- **P-L2**: `run_editor` uses `cmd.Start()` instead of `cmd.Run()`.
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- Tests extended: rxIdentityFile boundary cases, `TestVerifyMountDirRejectsSymlink`,
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existing `TestVerifyMountDir` paths now compared against `EvalSymlinks(base)`.
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