8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
nevaforget 37309ec566 ci: switch update-pkgver to tag-trigger (no-suffix pkgname) 2026-06-10 18:41:39 +02:00
nevaforget e51a847d48 fix: quit in ::unlocked instead of after unlock() (v0.6.17)
The real cause of the unlock SIGSEGV: gtk4-session-lock destroys the lock
windows itself when the lock ends (per its header), so unlock_callback's
`unlock(); app.quit();` destroyed them a second time — surface already gone
→ gdk_surface_get_display NULL → crash in gtk_window_destroy. Reproduces on
a plain single-monitor lock/unlock, no suspend needed.

unlock_callback now calls only unlock(); a new connect_unlocked handler
quits the app after the library finishes teardown. Mirrors the upstream
examples/simple.rs exactly.

Reverts the v0.6.15/v0.6.16 monitor-pruning + LockscreenHandles.monitor:
it was a misdiagnosis (the crash is monitor-independent) and manually
manipulated library-managed lock windows, which the upstream example
explicitly warns against. Monitor removal is left to the library.
2026-06-02 17:19:09 +02:00
nevaforget 215ab0a984 chore: drop unlock diagnostic instrumentation (v0.6.16)
The per-unlock window-state dump was scaffolding to prove the stale-window
hypothesis behind v0.6.15. With the fix in place, normal logging covers
validation: the prune handler already logs on monitor removal, and
coredumpctl shows whether the crash recurs. Remove the diagnostic block
and its all_handles_dbg clone; restore all_handles to its original spot.
2026-06-02 17:05:34 +02:00
nevaforget 492a781d92 fix: prune per-monitor windows on monitor removal (v0.6.15)
Resume-unlock SIGSEGV: connect_monitor only adds windows to all_handles,
never removes them when a monitor powers off on suspend. gtk4-session-lock
unmaps and drops its own ref, but the GtkApplication and all_handles keep
theirs, so the orphaned window survives until unlock — where destroying it
dereferences its now-NULL monitor association and crashes.

Watch display.monitors() and prune handles whose monitor is no longer
valid, releasing the app ref via remove_window (the lib already unmapped
and dereffed the window — we must not destroy it ourselves).

Revert the earlier idle_add_local_once deferral: the logs proved it
ineffective (crash happens inside the idle trampoline). Diagnostic unlock
logging kept until a suspend/resume cycle confirms the fix.
2026-06-02 16:32:29 +02:00
nevaforget 85cf039506 refactor: power-confirm via PowerAction table (v0.6.14)
Align the power-confirm flow to moonset's ActionDef pattern, in lockstep
with moongreet: a PowerAction table + create_power_button factory replace
the two hand-wired reboot/shutdown handlers and the loose-param
show_power_confirm. Add an in-flight re-trigger guard
(power_box.set_sensitive(false)) and clear a stale error_label when
showing a new prompt.
2026-06-02 14:31:50 +02:00
nevaforget 73c59e54c1 fix: drop pam_acct_mgmt from password and FP paths (v0.6.13)
Update PKGBUILD version / update-pkgver (push) Successful in 3s
The PAM stack only ever had `auth include login` — no account module.
auth.rs nevertheless called pam_acct_mgmt after pam_authenticate, which
fell back to /etc/pam.d/other (pam_deny) and rejected every password.
On the FP side, the same call was wrapped in a spawn_blocking + 2s
resume_async retry path that triggered a use-after-free in
gtk_window_destroy (20+ SIGSEGVs in 6 days).

- auth.rs: remove pam_acct_mgmt extern + call; return pam_authenticate
  result directly. Lockout still works via pam_faillock in the auth stack.
- auth.rs: drop check_account() and its tests (FP path no longer needs it).
- lockscreen.rs::start_fingerprint: on success go straight to
  label.set_text + fp.stop() + cb(); no PAM acct check, no resume retry.
- fingerprint.rs: remove resume_async() — no caller left.
- config/moonlock-pam: keep single `auth include login` line, matching
  swaylock/gtklock pattern.
- CLAUDE.md, DECISIONS.md updated.
2026-05-04 09:28:11 +02:00
nevaforget 3e610bdb4b fix: audit LOW fixes — docs, rustdoc, scope, debug gate, lto fat (v0.6.12)
Update PKGBUILD version / update-pkgver (push) Successful in 3s
- Update CLAUDE.md and README.md to reflect the blur range [0,200] that
  the code has clamped to since v0.6.8.
- Move the // SYNC: comment above the /// doc on MAX_BLUR_DIMENSION so
  rustdoc renders one coherent paragraph instead of a truncated sentence.
- Narrow check_account visibility to pub(crate) and document the caller
  precondition (username must come from users::get_current_user()).
- Gate MOONLOCK_DEBUG behind #[cfg(debug_assertions)]. Release builds
  always run at LevelFilter::Info so a session script cannot escalate
  journal verbosity to leak fprintd / D-Bus internals.
- Document why pam_setcred is deliberately not called in authenticate().
- Release profile: lto = "fat" instead of "thin" — doubles release build
  time for better cross-crate inlining on the auth + i18n hot paths.
2026-04-24 14:05:17 +02:00
nevaforget 9dfd1829e9 fix: audit MEDIUM fixes — D-Bus race, TOCTOU, FP reset, entry clear (v0.6.11)
- fingerprint: split cleanup_dbus into a sync take_cleanup_proxy() + async
  perform_dbus_cleanup(). resume_async now awaits VerifyStop+Release before
  re-claiming, so fprintd cannot reject the Claim on a slow bus. stop()
  still spawns the cleanup fire-and-forget.
- fingerprint: remove failed_attempts = 0 from resume_async. An attacker
  with sensor control could otherwise cycle verify-match → account-fail →
  resume and never trip the 10-attempt cap.
- lockscreen: open the wallpaper with O_NOFOLLOW and build the texture
  from bytes, closing the TOCTOU between the symlink check and Texture::
  from_file.
- lockscreen: clear password_entry immediately after extracting the
  Zeroizing<String>, shortening the window the GLib GString copy stays in
  libc-malloc'd memory.
2026-04-24 13:21:19 +02:00
11 changed files with 253 additions and 222 deletions
+11 -11
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@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
# ABOUTME: Updates pkgver in moonarch-pkgbuilds after a push to main. # ABOUTME: Updates pkgver in moonarch-pkgbuilds when a new moonlock tag is pushed.
# ABOUTME: Ensures paru detects new versions of this package. # ABOUTME: Reads the latest version tag and bumps the PKGBUILD + .SRCINFO.
name: Update PKGBUILD version name: Update PKGBUILD version
on: on:
push: push:
branches: tags:
- main - 'v*'
jobs: jobs:
update-pkgver: update-pkgver:
runs-on: moonarch runs-on: moonarch
steps: steps:
- name: Checkout source repo - name: Determine pkgver from latest tag
run: | run: |
git clone --bare http://gitea:3000/nevaforget/moonlock.git source.git git clone --bare http://gitea:3000/nevaforget/moonlock.git source.git
cd source.git cd source.git
PKGVER=$(git describe --long --tags | sed 's/^v//;s/-/.r/;s/-/./') PKGVER=$(git describe --tags --abbrev=0 | sed 's/^v//')
echo "New pkgver: $PKGVER" echo "New pkgver: $PKGVER"
echo "$PKGVER" > /tmp/pkgver echo "$PKGVER" > /tmp/pkgver
@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@ jobs:
git clone http://gitea:3000/nevaforget/moonarch-pkgbuilds.git pkgbuilds git clone http://gitea:3000/nevaforget/moonarch-pkgbuilds.git pkgbuilds
cd pkgbuilds cd pkgbuilds
OLD_VER=$(grep '^pkgver=' moonlock-git/PKGBUILD | cut -d= -f2) OLD_VER=$(grep '^pkgver=' moonlock/PKGBUILD | cut -d= -f2)
if [ "$OLD_VER" = "$PKGVER" ]; then if [ "$OLD_VER" = "$PKGVER" ]; then
echo "pkgver already up to date ($PKGVER)" echo "pkgver already up to date ($PKGVER)"
exit 0 exit 0
fi fi
sed -i "s/^pkgver=.*/pkgver=$PKGVER/" moonlock-git/PKGBUILD sed -i "s/^pkgver=.*/pkgver=$PKGVER/" moonlock/PKGBUILD
sed -i "s/^\tpkgver = .*/\tpkgver = $PKGVER/" moonlock-git/.SRCINFO sed -i "s/^\tpkgver = .*/\tpkgver = $PKGVER/" moonlock/.SRCINFO
echo "Updated pkgver: $OLD_VER → $PKGVER" echo "Updated pkgver: $OLD_VER → $PKGVER"
git config user.name "pkgver-bot" git config user.name "pkgver-bot"
git config user.email "gitea@moonarch.de" git config user.email "gitea@moonarch.de"
git add moonlock-git/PKGBUILD moonlock-git/.SRCINFO git add moonlock/PKGBUILD moonlock/.SRCINFO
git commit -m "chore(moonlock-git): bump pkgver to $PKGVER" git commit -m "chore(moonlock): bump pkgver to $PKGVER"
git -c http.extraHeader="Authorization: token ${{ secrets.PKGBUILD_TOKEN }}" push git -c http.extraHeader="Authorization: token ${{ secrets.PKGBUILD_TOKEN }}" push
+6 -5
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@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libgtk4-layer-shell.so ./target/release/moonlock
## Architektur ## Architektur
- `auth.rs` — PAM-Authentifizierung via Raw FFI (unsafe extern "C" conv callback, msg_style-aware, Zeroizing<CString>), check_account() für pam_acct_mgmt-Only-Checks nach Fingerprint-Unlock - `auth.rs` — PAM-Authentifizierung via Raw FFI (unsafe extern "C" conv callback, msg_style-aware, Zeroizing<CString>)
- `fingerprint.rs` — fprintd D-Bus Listener, async init/claim/verify via gio futures, sender-validated signal handler, cleanup_dbus() für sauberen D-Bus-Lifecycle, running_flag für Race-Safety in async restarts, on_exhausted callback after MAX_FP_ATTEMPTS, resume_async() für Neustart nach transientem Fehler (mit failed_attempts-Reset und Signal-Handler-Cleanup) - `fingerprint.rs` — fprintd D-Bus Listener, async init/claim/verify via gio futures, sender-validated signal handler, cleanup_dbus() für sauberen D-Bus-Lifecycle, running_flag für Race-Safety in async restarts, on_exhausted callback after MAX_FP_ATTEMPTS, resume_async() für Neustart nach transientem Fehler (mit failed_attempts-Reset und Signal-Handler-Cleanup)
- `users.rs` — Aktuellen User via nix getuid, Avatar-Loading mit Symlink-Rejection - `users.rs` — Aktuellen User via nix getuid, Avatar-Loading mit Symlink-Rejection
- `power.rs` — Reboot/Shutdown via /usr/bin/systemctl - `power.rs` — Reboot/Shutdown via /usr/bin/systemctl
- `i18n.rs` — Locale-Erkennung (OnceLock-cached) und String-Tabellen (DE/EN), faillock_warning mit konfigurierbarem max_attempts - `i18n.rs` — Locale-Erkennung (OnceLock-cached) und String-Tabellen (DE/EN), faillock_warning mit konfigurierbarem max_attempts
- `config.rs` — TOML-Config (background_path, background_blur clamped [0,100], fingerprint_enabled als Option<bool>) + Wallpaper-Fallback + Symlink-Rejection via symlink_metadata + Parse-Error-Logging - `config.rs` — TOML-Config (background_path, background_blur clamped [0,200], fingerprint_enabled als Option<bool>) + Wallpaper-Fallback + Symlink-Rejection via symlink_metadata + Parse-Error-Logging
- `lockscreen.rs` — GTK4 UI via LockscreenHandles, PAM-Auth via gio::spawn_blocking mit 30s Timeout und Generation Counter, FP-Label/Start separat verdrahtet mit pam_acct_mgmt-Check und auto-resume, Zeroizing<String> für Passwort, Power-Confirm, GPU-Blur via GskBlurNode (Downscale auf max 1920px), Blur/Avatar-Cache für Multi-Monitor - `lockscreen.rs` — GTK4 UI via LockscreenHandles, PAM-Auth via gio::spawn_blocking mit 30s Timeout und Generation Counter, FP-Success ruft unlock_callback direkt (PAM-Stack ohne account-Modul, Lockout via auth-Pfad und MAX_FP_ATTEMPTS), Zeroizing<String> für Passwort, Power-Confirm, GPU-Blur via GskBlurNode (Downscale auf max 1920px), Blur/Avatar-Cache für Multi-Monitor
- `main.rs` — Entry Point, Panic-Hook (vor Logging), Root-Check, ext-session-lock-v1 (Pflicht in Release), Monitor-Hotplug via `connect_monitor`-Signal (v1_2), shared Blur/Avatar-Caches in Rc, systemd-Journal-Logging, Debug-Level per `MOONLOCK_DEBUG` Env-Var, async fprintd-Init nach window.present() - `main.rs` — Entry Point, Panic-Hook (vor Logging), Root-Check, ext-session-lock-v1 (Pflicht in Release), Monitor-Hotplug via `connect_monitor`-Signal (v1_2), Unlock via `unlock()` + `connect_unlocked``app.quit()` (Lib zerstört die Lock-Fenster selbst beim Lock-Ende — kein eigenes Destroy/quit, sonst Double-Destroy-SIGSEGV), shared Blur/Avatar-Caches in Rc, systemd-Journal-Logging, Debug-Level per `MOONLOCK_DEBUG` Env-Var, async fprintd-Init nach window.present()
## Sicherheit ## Sicherheit
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libgtk4-layer-shell.so ./target/release/moonlock
- PAM-Callback: msg_style-aware (Passwort nur bei PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF), strdup-OOM-sicher, num_msg-Guard gegen negative Werte - PAM-Callback: msg_style-aware (Passwort nur bei PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF), strdup-OOM-sicher, num_msg-Guard gegen negative Werte
- fprintd: D-Bus Signal-Sender wird gegen fprintd's unique bus name validiert (Anti-Spoofing) - fprintd: D-Bus Signal-Sender wird gegen fprintd's unique bus name validiert (Anti-Spoofing)
- Passwort: Zeroizing<String> ab GTK-Entry-Extraktion, Zeroizing<CString> im PAM-FFI-Layer (bekannte Einschränkung: GLib-GString und strdup-Kopie in PAM werden nicht gezeroized — inhärente GTK/libc-Limitierung) - Passwort: Zeroizing<String> ab GTK-Entry-Extraktion, Zeroizing<CString> im PAM-FFI-Layer (bekannte Einschränkung: GLib-GString und strdup-Kopie in PAM werden nicht gezeroized — inhärente GTK/libc-Limitierung)
- Fingerprint-Unlock: pam_acct_mgmt-Check nach verify-match erzwingt Account-Policies (Lockout, Ablauf), resume_async() startet FP bei transientem Fehler neu (mit failed_attempts-Reset und Signal-Handler-Cleanup) - Fingerprint-Unlock: ruft unlock_callback direkt nach verify-match (kein zusätzlicher PAM-acct-Check, weil PAM-Stack nur `auth include login` enthält — wie swaylock); FP-Lockout ist über MAX_FP_ATTEMPTS in fingerprint.rs umgesetzt
- PAM-Stack: nur `auth include login` (Standard-Pattern wie swaylock/gtklock); kein `account`/`session`-Stack, weil Lockscreen keinen Session-Lifecycle managed und `pam_unix(account)` setuid root benötigt
- Wallpaper wird vor lock() geladen — connect_monitor feuert während lock() und braucht die Textur; lokales JPEG-Laden ist schnell genug - Wallpaper wird vor lock() geladen — connect_monitor feuert während lock() und braucht die Textur; lokales JPEG-Laden ist schnell genug
- PAM-Timeout: 30s Timeout verhindert permanentes Aussperren bei hängenden PAM-Modulen, Generation Counter verhindert Interferenz paralleler Auth-Versuche - PAM-Timeout: 30s Timeout verhindert permanentes Aussperren bei hängenden PAM-Modulen, Generation Counter verhindert Interferenz paralleler Auth-Versuche
- Root-Check: Exit mit Fehler wenn als root gestartet - Root-Check: Exit mit Fehler wenn als root gestartet
Generated
+1 -1
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@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]] [[package]]
name = "moonlock" name = "moonlock"
version = "0.6.9" version = "0.6.17"
dependencies = [ dependencies = [
"gdk-pixbuf", "gdk-pixbuf",
"gdk4", "gdk4",
+3 -2
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package] [package]
name = "moonlock" name = "moonlock"
version = "0.6.10" version = "0.6.17"
edition = "2024" edition = "2024"
description = "A secure Wayland lockscreen with GTK4, PAM and fingerprint support" description = "A secure Wayland lockscreen with GTK4, PAM and fingerprint support"
license = "MIT" license = "MIT"
@@ -30,4 +30,5 @@ glib-build-tools = "0.22"
[profile.release] [profile.release]
lto = "thin" lto = "thin"
codegen-units = 1 codegen-units = 1
strip = true strip = false
debug = true
+42
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@@ -2,6 +2,48 @@
Architectural and design decisions for Moonlock, in reverse chronological order. Architectural and design decisions for Moonlock, in reverse chronological order.
## 2026-06-02 Real fix for the unlock SIGSEGV: quit in ::unlocked, never destroy windows ourselves (v0.6.17)
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
- **Why**: The v0.6.15 "stale per-monitor window" theory was a **misdiagnosis**. A clean manual `target/release/moonlock` lock→unlock (single monitor, no suspend, no monitor removal) still crashed, preceded by `Gdk-CRITICAL: gdk_surface_get_display: assertion 'GDK_IS_SURFACE (surface)' failed`. The v0.6.16 backtrace's top app frame is the `unlock_callback` closure, which ran `lock.unlock(); app.quit();`. Per the gtk4-session-lock header (`assign_window_to_monitor`: "the window will be unmapped and `gtk_window_destroy()` called on it when the current lock ends") the **library destroys the lock windows itself** on unlock. `app.quit()` then destroyed the same windows again — surface already gone → SIGSEGV. A double-destroy in the teardown sequence, entirely independent of monitors.
- **Tradeoffs**: Reverted the v0.6.15/v0.6.16 monitor-pruning + `LockscreenHandles.monitor` field: it targeted the wrong cause, never fired in testing, and manually called `app.remove_window()` on library-managed lock windows — exactly what the upstream example warns against ("does NOT manually destroy or close the lock windows"). Monitor-removal-during-lock is left entirely to the library (which already auto-unmaps+dereferences such windows). Three attempts total: idle_add deferral (wrong: reentrancy theory), monitor-pruning (wrong: misdiagnosis), and this one — verified against both the C header and the upstream `examples/simple.rs`.
- **How**: `unlock_callback` now calls only `lock.unlock()`. A new `lock.connect_unlocked(|_| app.quit())` quits the app only after the library finishes its teardown and fires `::unlocked`. Mirrors the canonical gtk4-session-lock usage exactly.
## 2026-06-02 Prune per-monitor windows on monitor removal to fix resume-unlock SIGSEGV (v0.6.15)
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
- **Why**: Chronic SIGSEGV (multiple coredumps/day) on the unlock following a suspend/resume. Backtrace: `app.quit()``gtk_window_destroy` → gtk4-layer-shell → `g_signal_emit` → NULL deref (`0x278`, rax=0). Root cause: `connect_monitor` is add-only — it creates one window per monitor and pushes to `all_handles`, but nothing ever removes a window when a monitor powers off on suspend. gtk4-session-lock unmaps + drops *its* ref to that window on monitor removal (per `gtk4-session-lock` 0.4 docs), but the GtkApplication (`ApplicationWindow::builder().application(app)`) and `all_handles` still hold refs. The orphaned window survives until unlock, where destroying it dereferences its now-NULL monitor association. A diagnostic confirmed the windows are GTK-valid but accumulate (3 windows for 1-2 monitors) with a NULL associated object.
- **Tradeoffs**: An earlier attempt deferred `unlock()`/`quit()` via `glib::idle_add_local_once` on a reentrancy theory — proven wrong by the logs (crash happens *inside* the idle trampoline). Reverted. The library doc explicitly says monitor removal is detected via "GTK APIs"; we follow that rather than fighting the library. We release our refs (do **not** call `destroy` — the lib already unmapped+dereffed the window). Diagnostic UNLOCK logging is kept for now, to be removed once a suspend/resume validation cycle confirms the fix.
- **How**: `LockscreenHandles` gains `monitor: Option<gdk::Monitor>`, set in the `connect_monitor` handler. `activate_with_session_lock` watches `display.monitors()` via `connect_items_changed`; on any change it retains only handles whose monitor `is_valid()`, calling `app.remove_window()` on the pruned ones to drop the application's ref. With both refs released, the orphaned window is gone before unlock.
## 2026-06-02 Align power-confirm to moonset's ActionDef pattern (v0.6.14)
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
- **Why**: A code review of moongreet's power-confirm (ported from this file) flagged the shared pattern as lower-altitude than moonset's: two near-identical reboot/shutdown handlers and a `show_power_confirm` taking loose `message`/`action_fn`/`error_message` params that can drift apart. moonset already solved this with an `ActionDef` table + button factory. Changed here in lockstep with moongreet to keep the three projects symmetric.
- **Tradeoffs**: A `PowerAction` struct + `power_actions()` table + `create_power_button` factory is slightly more machinery for two actions, but couples icon/prompt/error/action into one value (a mismatched prompt/action becomes unrepresentable) and makes a third action a one-line table entry. Did NOT touch `confirm_box: Rc<RefCell<Option<gtk::Box>>>` — moonset uses the same, it is the shared convention.
- **How**: Replaced the two hand-wired handlers with a loop over `power_actions()`; `show_power_confirm`/`execute_power_action` now take `PowerAction` (Copy) instead of three loose strings. Added an in-flight re-trigger guard via `power_box.set_sensitive(false)` (re-enabled on failure), matching moonset; also clear a stale `error_label` when showing a new prompt.
## 2026-05-04 Drop PAM account/session stack, remove `check_account`, drop `pam_acct_mgmt` from password path (v0.6.13)
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
- **Why**: 20 SIGSEGV coredumps in 6 days. All crashes preceded by `pam_unix(moonlock:account): setuid failed: Operation not permitted`. The previous PAM config (`auth/account/session include system-auth`) pulled `pam_unix(account)`, which needs setuid root for `/etc/shadow`. moonlock runs as the user, so `pam_acct_mgmt` always failed. The failure cascaded into the FP-resume path (`gio::spawn_blocking(check_account) → false → 2s timeout → resume_async`) where a use-after-free during `gtk_window_destroy` killed the process. Each crash left a dead `ext-session-lock-v1` client and the compositor stuck on its red fallback backdrop until manual recovery. Initial fix on 2026-04-30 dropped the FP-side `check_account` and the account/session lines from the PAM config, but left the `pam_acct_mgmt` call in `auth.rs::authenticate()` for the password path. Result: a PAM stack with no `account` module fell back to `/etc/pam.d/other` (`pam_deny`) and rejected every password — Dom got locked out on 2026-05-04.
- **Tradeoffs**: Aligned with the swaylock/gtklock pattern (only `auth include login`). Lost: PAM-driven account expiry/lockout in both paths. Acceptable because (a) FP attempts are still bounded by `MAX_FP_ATTEMPTS` in `fingerprint.rs`, (b) password-path lockout still works through `pam_faillock.so preauth/authfail/authsucc` in the inherited `auth` stack, and (c) account validity was already verified by the login manager when the session was opened — a lockscreen unlocks an existing session, it does not gate access to a new one. Not chosen: a custom `account` stack with `pam_faillock.so` only — would have kept PAM-level FP lockout but adds a non-standard config that other lockers do not use, and `pam_faillock` standalone in `account` is rarely tested in the wild.
- **How**: (1) `config/moonlock-pam` reduced to a single `auth include login` line. (2) `auth.rs::check_account()` and its two unit tests removed. (3) `auth.rs::authenticate()` no longer calls `pam_acct_mgmt`; `pam_authenticate` result is returned directly. The `pam_acct_mgmt` extern declaration is removed. (4) `lockscreen.rs::start_fingerprint` simplified — the `gio::spawn_blocking(check_account)` async block, the failure-side error UI, and the 2-second `resume_async` retry path all removed; on FP success the closure now goes `label.set_text(success); fp.stop(); cb()`. (5) `fingerprint.rs::resume_async()` removed. (6) `CLAUDE.md` architecture and security sections updated to describe the new PAM stack.
## 2026-04-24 Audit LOW fixes: docs, rustdoc, check_account scope, debug gating, lto fat (v0.6.12)
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
- **Why**: Six LOW findings cleared in a single pass. (1) Docs referenced the old `[0,100]` blur range; code clamps `[0,200]` since v0.6.8. (2) The `MAX_BLUR_DIMENSION` doc comment was split by a `// SYNC:` block, producing a truncated sentence in rustdoc. (3) `check_account` was `pub` and relied on callers only ever passing `getuid()`-derived usernames; the contract was not enforced by the type system. (4) `MOONLOCK_DEBUG` env var flipped log verbosity to Debug in release builds, letting a compromised session script escalate journal noise about fprintd / D-Bus. (5) `pam_setcred` absence was undocumented. (6) `[profile.release]` used `lto = "thin"` — fine for most crates, but for a latency-critical auth binary compiled once per release, fat LTO's extra cross-crate inlining is worth the ~1 min build hit.
- **Tradeoffs**: `lto = "fat"` roughly doubles release build time (~30 s → ~60 s) for slightly better inlining across PAM FFI wrappers and the i18n/status paths. `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]` on the debug-level selector means you have to run a debug build to raise log level — inconvenient for live troubleshooting, but aligned with the security-first posture.
- **How**: (1) `CLAUDE.md` + `README.md` updated to `[0,200]`. (2) `// SYNC:` block moved above the `///` doc so rustdoc renders one coherent paragraph. (3) `check_account` visibility narrowed to `pub(crate)` with a `Precondition` paragraph explaining the username contract. (4) Debug-level selection wrapped in `#[cfg(debug_assertions)]`; release builds always run at `LevelFilter::Info`. (5) Added a comment block in `authenticate()` documenting why `pam_setcred` is deliberately absent and where it would hook in if needed. (6) `lto = "fat"` in `Cargo.toml`.
## 2026-04-24 Audit MEDIUM fixes: D-Bus cleanup race, TOCTOU open, FP reset, GTK entry clear (v0.6.11)
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
- **Why**: Second round after the HIGH fixes, addressing the four MEDIUM findings. (1) `cleanup_dbus` spawned VerifyStop + Release as fire-and-forget, then `resume_async` called Claim after only a 2 s timeout — shorter than the 3 s D-Bus timeout, so on a slow bus the Claim could race the Release and fprintd would reject it, leaving the FP listener permanently dead. (2) `load_background_texture` relied on the caller's `symlink_metadata` check, re-opening the path via `gdk::Texture::from_file` — a classic TOCTOU window. (3) `resume_async` unconditionally reset `failed_attempts`, allowing an attacker with sensor control to evade the 10-attempt cap by cycling verify-match → `check_account` fail → resume. (4) The GTK `PasswordEntry` buffer was only cleared on timeout or auth failure, leaving the password in GLib malloc'd memory longer than necessary.
- **Tradeoffs**: The D-Bus cleanup is now split into a synchronous helper (`take_cleanup_proxy` — signal disconnect + flag clear) and an async helper (`perform_dbus_cleanup` — VerifyStop + Release), so `resume_async` can await the release while `stop()` stays fire-and-forget. Dropping the `failed_attempts` reset means a flaky sensor could reach 10 failures faster, but the correct remedy is a new lock session (construction) rather than a reset that also helps attackers.
- **How**: (1) Split `cleanup_dbus` into `take_cleanup_proxy()` (sync) + `perform_dbus_cleanup(proxy)` (async). `resume_async` now awaits `perform_dbus_cleanup` before `begin_verification`. `stop()` still spawns the cleanup fire-and-forget. (2) `load_background_texture` opens with `O_NOFOLLOW` via `std::fs::OpenOptions::custom_flags`, reads to bytes, and builds the texture via `gdk::Texture::from_bytes`. (3) Removed `listener.borrow_mut().failed_attempts = 0` from `resume_async`. (4) `password_entry.set_text("")` now fires right after the `Zeroizing::new(entry.text().to_string())` extraction, shortening the GTK-side window.
## 2026-04-24 Audit fixes: RefCell borrow across await, async avatar decode ## 2026-04-24 Audit fixes: RefCell borrow across await, async avatar decode
- **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom - **Who**: ClaudeCode, Dom
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Part of the Moonarch ecosystem.
- **PAM authentication** — Uses system PAM stack (`/etc/pam.d/moonlock`) with 30s timeout and generation counter - **PAM authentication** — Uses system PAM stack (`/etc/pam.d/moonlock`) with 30s timeout and generation counter
- **Fingerprint unlock** — fprintd D-Bus integration with sender validation, async init (window appears instantly), `pam_acct_mgmt` check after verify, auto-resume on transient errors - **Fingerprint unlock** — fprintd D-Bus integration with sender validation, async init (window appears instantly), `pam_acct_mgmt` check after verify, auto-resume on transient errors
- **Multi-monitor + hotplug** — Lockscreen on every monitor with shared blur and avatar caches; monitors added after suspend/resume get windows automatically via `connect_monitor` signal - **Multi-monitor + hotplug** — Lockscreen on every monitor with shared blur and avatar caches; monitors added after suspend/resume get windows automatically via `connect_monitor` signal
- **GPU blur** — Background blur via GskBlurNode (downscale to max 1920px, configurable 0100) - **GPU blur** — Background blur via GskBlurNode (downscale to max 1920px, configurable 0200)
- **i18n** — German and English (auto-detected) - **i18n** — German and English (auto-detected)
- **Faillock warning** — Progressive UI warning after failed attempts, PAM decides lockout - **Faillock warning** — Progressive UI warning after failed attempts, PAM decides lockout
- **Panic safety** — Panic hook logs but never unlocks (installed before logging) - **Panic safety** — Panic hook logs but never unlocks (installed before logging)
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Create `/etc/moonlock/moonlock.toml` or `~/.config/moonlock/moonlock.toml`:
```toml ```toml
background_path = "/usr/share/wallpapers/moon.jpg" background_path = "/usr/share/wallpapers/moon.jpg"
background_blur = 40.0 # 0.0100.0, optional background_blur = 40.0 # 0.0200.0, optional
fingerprint_enabled = true fingerprint_enabled = true
``` ```
+1 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,2 @@
#%PAM-1.0 #%PAM-1.0
auth include system-auth auth include login
account include system-auth
session include system-auth
+13 -68
View File
@@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ unsafe extern "C" {
fn pam_authenticate(pamh: *mut libc::c_void, flags: libc::c_int) -> libc::c_int; fn pam_authenticate(pamh: *mut libc::c_void, flags: libc::c_int) -> libc::c_int;
fn pam_acct_mgmt(pamh: *mut libc::c_void, flags: libc::c_int) -> libc::c_int;
fn pam_end(pamh: *mut libc::c_void, pam_status: libc::c_int) -> libc::c_int; fn pam_end(pamh: *mut libc::c_void, pam_status: libc::c_int) -> libc::c_int;
} }
@@ -191,64 +189,23 @@ pub fn authenticate(username: &str, password: &str) -> bool {
return false; return false;
} }
// Safety: handle is valid and non-null after successful pam_start // Safety: handle is valid and non-null after successful pam_start.
// Note: pam_setcred is intentionally NOT called here. A lockscreen unlocks
// an existing session whose credentials were already established at login;
// refreshing them would duplicate work done by the session's login manager.
// If per-unlock credential refresh (Kerberos tickets, pam_gnome_keyring)
// is ever desired, hook it here with PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED.
//
// pam_acct_mgmt is intentionally NOT called: the PAM stack (`auth include
// login`) has no `account` module, and pam_unix(account) requires setuid
// root for /etc/shadow. Lockout/faillock and policy checks happen inside
// the inherited auth stack via pam_faillock. See DECISIONS.md 2026-04-30.
let auth_ret = unsafe { pam_authenticate(handle, 0) }; let auth_ret = unsafe { pam_authenticate(handle, 0) };
let acct_ret = if auth_ret == PAM_SUCCESS {
// Safety: handle is valid, check account restrictions
unsafe { pam_acct_mgmt(handle, 0) }
} else {
auth_ret
};
// Safety: handle is valid, pam_end cleans up the PAM session // Safety: handle is valid, pam_end cleans up the PAM session
unsafe { pam_end(handle, acct_ret) }; unsafe { pam_end(handle, auth_ret) };
acct_ret == PAM_SUCCESS auth_ret == PAM_SUCCESS
}
/// Check account restrictions via PAM without authentication.
///
/// Used after fingerprint unlock to enforce account policies (lockout, expiry)
/// that would otherwise be bypassed when not going through pam_authenticate.
/// Returns true if the account is valid and allowed to log in.
pub fn check_account(username: &str) -> bool {
let service = match CString::new("moonlock") {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(_) => return false,
};
let username_cstr = match CString::new(username) {
Ok(c) => c,
Err(_) => return false,
};
// No password needed — we only check account status, not authenticate.
// PAM conv callback is required by pam_start but won't be called for acct_mgmt.
let empty_password = Zeroizing::new(CString::new("").unwrap());
let conv = PamConv {
conv: pam_conv_callback,
appdata_ptr: std::ptr::from_ref::<CString>(&empty_password) as *mut libc::c_void,
};
let mut handle: *mut libc::c_void = ptr::null_mut();
let ret = unsafe {
pam_start(
service.as_ptr(),
username_cstr.as_ptr(),
&conv,
&mut handle,
)
};
if ret != PAM_SUCCESS || handle.is_null() {
return false;
}
let acct_ret = unsafe { pam_acct_mgmt(handle, 0) };
unsafe { pam_end(handle, acct_ret) };
acct_ret == PAM_SUCCESS
} }
#[cfg(test)] #[cfg(test)]
@@ -285,16 +242,4 @@ mod tests {
let result = authenticate("", "password"); let result = authenticate("", "password");
assert!(!result); assert!(!result);
} }
#[test]
fn check_account_empty_username_fails() {
let result = check_account("");
assert!(!result);
}
#[test]
fn check_account_null_byte_username_fails() {
let result = check_account("user\0name");
assert!(!result);
}
} }
+23 -28
View File
@@ -175,17 +175,6 @@ impl FingerprintListener {
Self::begin_verification(listener, username).await; Self::begin_verification(listener, username).await;
} }
/// Resume fingerprint verification after a transient interruption (e.g. failed
/// PAM account check). Reuses previously stored callbacks. Re-claims the device
/// and restarts verification from scratch.
pub async fn resume_async(
listener: &Rc<RefCell<FingerprintListener>>,
username: &str,
) {
listener.borrow_mut().failed_attempts = 0;
Self::begin_verification(listener, username).await;
}
/// Claim device, start verification, and connect D-Bus signal handler. /// Claim device, start verification, and connect D-Bus signal handler.
/// Assumes device_proxy is set and callbacks are already stored. /// Assumes device_proxy is set and callbacks are already stored.
async fn begin_verification( async fn begin_verification(
@@ -352,26 +341,32 @@ impl FingerprintListener {
} }
} }
/// Disconnect the signal handler and send VerifyStop + Release to fprintd. /// Disconnect the signal handler and clear running flags. Returns the proxy
/// Signal disconnect is synchronous to prevent further callbacks. /// the caller should use for the async D-Bus cleanup (VerifyStop + Release).
/// D-Bus cleanup is fire-and-forget to avoid blocking the UI. fn take_cleanup_proxy(&mut self) -> Option<gio::DBusProxy> {
fn cleanup_dbus(&mut self) {
self.running = false; self.running = false;
self.running_flag.set(false); self.running_flag.set(false);
if let Some(ref proxy) = self.device_proxy { let proxy = self.device_proxy.clone()?;
if let Some(id) = self.signal_id.take() { if let Some(id) = self.signal_id.take() {
proxy.disconnect(id); proxy.disconnect(id);
} }
let proxy = proxy.clone(); Some(proxy)
glib::spawn_future_local(async move { }
let _ = proxy
.call_future("VerifyStop", None, gio::DBusCallFlags::NONE, DBUS_TIMEOUT_MS) async fn perform_dbus_cleanup(proxy: gio::DBusProxy) {
.await; let _ = proxy
let _ = proxy .call_future("VerifyStop", None, gio::DBusCallFlags::NONE, DBUS_TIMEOUT_MS)
.call_future("Release", None, gio::DBusCallFlags::NONE, DBUS_TIMEOUT_MS) .await;
.await; let _ = proxy
}); .call_future("Release", None, gio::DBusCallFlags::NONE, DBUS_TIMEOUT_MS)
.await;
}
/// Fire-and-forget cleanup for code paths that cannot await (e.g. drop, stop).
fn cleanup_dbus(&mut self) {
if let Some(proxy) = self.take_cleanup_proxy() {
glib::spawn_future_local(Self::perform_dbus_cleanup(proxy));
} }
} }
+131 -100
View File
@@ -170,55 +170,17 @@ pub fn create_lockscreen_window(
power_box.set_margin_end(16); power_box.set_margin_end(16);
power_box.set_margin_bottom(16); power_box.set_margin_bottom(16);
let reboot_btn = gtk::Button::new(); for action in power_actions() {
reboot_btn.set_icon_name("system-reboot-symbolic"); let button = create_power_button(
reboot_btn.add_css_class("power-button"); action,
reboot_btn.set_tooltip_text(Some(strings.reboot_tooltip)); strings,
reboot_btn.connect_clicked(clone!( &power_box,
#[weak] &confirm_area,
confirm_area, &confirm_box,
#[strong] &error_label,
confirm_box, );
#[weak] power_box.append(&button);
error_label, }
move |_| {
show_power_confirm(
strings.reboot_confirm,
power::reboot,
strings.reboot_failed,
strings,
&confirm_area,
&confirm_box,
&error_label,
);
}
));
power_box.append(&reboot_btn);
let shutdown_btn = gtk::Button::new();
shutdown_btn.set_icon_name("system-shutdown-symbolic");
shutdown_btn.add_css_class("power-button");
shutdown_btn.set_tooltip_text(Some(strings.shutdown_tooltip));
shutdown_btn.connect_clicked(clone!(
#[weak]
confirm_area,
#[strong]
confirm_box,
#[weak]
error_label,
move |_| {
show_power_confirm(
strings.shutdown_confirm,
power::shutdown,
strings.shutdown_failed,
strings,
&confirm_area,
&confirm_box,
&error_label,
);
}
));
power_box.append(&shutdown_btn);
overlay.add_overlay(&power_box); overlay.add_overlay(&power_box);
@@ -244,6 +206,10 @@ pub fn create_lockscreen_window(
if password.is_empty() { if password.is_empty() {
return; return;
} }
// Clear the GTK entry's internal buffer as early as possible. GTK allocates
// the backing GString via libc malloc, which zeroize cannot reach — the
// best we can do is shorten the window during which it resides in memory.
entry.set_text("");
entry.set_sensitive(false); entry.set_sensitive(false);
let username = username.clone(); let username = username.clone();
@@ -423,52 +389,16 @@ pub fn start_fingerprint(
let unlock_cb_fp = handles.unlock_callback.clone(); let unlock_cb_fp = handles.unlock_callback.clone();
let fp_rc_success = fp_rc.clone(); let fp_rc_success = fp_rc.clone();
let fp_username = handles.username.clone();
let on_success = move || { let on_success = move || {
let label = fp_label_success.clone(); let label = fp_label_success.clone();
let cb = unlock_cb_fp.clone(); let cb = unlock_cb_fp.clone();
let fp = fp_rc_success.clone(); let fp = fp_rc_success.clone();
let username = fp_username.clone();
glib::idle_add_local_once(move || { glib::idle_add_local_once(move || {
let strings = load_strings(None); let strings = load_strings(None);
label.set_text(strings.fingerprint_success); label.set_text(strings.fingerprint_success);
label.add_css_class("success"); label.add_css_class("success");
// stop() is idempotent — cleanup_dbus() already ran inside on_verify_status,
// but this mirrors the PAM success path for defense-in-depth.
fp.borrow_mut().stop(); fp.borrow_mut().stop();
cb();
// Enforce PAM account policies (lockout, expiry) before unlocking.
// Fingerprint auth bypasses pam_authenticate, so we must explicitly
// check account restrictions via pam_acct_mgmt.
glib::spawn_future_local(async move {
let user = username.clone();
let result = gio::spawn_blocking(move || {
auth::check_account(&user)
}).await;
match result {
Ok(true) => cb(),
_ => {
log::error!("PAM account check failed after fingerprint auth");
let strings = load_strings(None);
label.set_text(strings.wrong_password);
label.remove_css_class("success");
label.add_css_class("failed");
// Restart FP verification after delay — the failure may be
// transient (e.g. PAM module timeout). If the account is truly
// locked, check_account will fail again on next match.
glib::timeout_add_local_once(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(2),
move || {
label.set_text(load_strings(None).fingerprint_prompt);
label.remove_css_class("failed");
glib::spawn_future_local(async move {
FingerprintListener::resume_async(&fp, &username).await;
});
},
);
}
}
});
}); });
}; };
@@ -518,12 +448,35 @@ pub fn start_fingerprint(
/// Load the wallpaper as a texture once, for sharing across all windows. /// Load the wallpaper as a texture once, for sharing across all windows.
/// Returns None if no wallpaper path is provided or the file cannot be loaded. /// Returns None if no wallpaper path is provided or the file cannot be loaded.
/// Blur is applied at render time via GPU (GskBlurNode), not here. /// Blur is applied at render time via GPU (GskBlurNode), not here.
///
/// Opens the file with O_NOFOLLOW to close the TOCTOU window between the
/// symlink check in `resolve_background_path_with` and this read. If the path
/// was swapped for a symlink after the check, `open` fails with ELOOP.
pub fn load_background_texture(bg_path: &Path) -> Option<gdk::Texture> { pub fn load_background_texture(bg_path: &Path) -> Option<gdk::Texture> {
let file = gio::File::for_path(bg_path); use std::io::Read;
match gdk::Texture::from_file(&file) { use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
let mut file = match std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.custom_flags(libc::O_NOFOLLOW)
.open(bg_path)
{
Ok(f) => f,
Err(e) => {
log::warn!("Failed to open wallpaper {}: {e}", bg_path.display());
return None;
}
};
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
if let Err(e) = file.read_to_end(&mut bytes) {
log::warn!("Failed to read wallpaper {}: {e}", bg_path.display());
return None;
}
let glib_bytes = glib::Bytes::from_owned(bytes);
match gdk::Texture::from_bytes(&glib_bytes) {
Ok(texture) => Some(texture), Ok(texture) => Some(texture),
Err(e) => { Err(e) => {
log::warn!("Failed to load wallpaper {}: {e}", bg_path.display()); log::warn!("Failed to decode wallpaper {}: {e}", bg_path.display());
None None
} }
} }
@@ -565,11 +518,11 @@ fn create_background_picture(
background background
} }
/// Maximum texture dimension for blur input. Textures larger than this are
// SYNC: MAX_BLUR_DIMENSION, render_blurred_texture, and create_background_picture // SYNC: MAX_BLUR_DIMENSION, render_blurred_texture, and create_background_picture
// are duplicated in moongreet/src/greeter.rs and moonset/src/panel.rs. // are duplicated in moongreet/src/greeter.rs and moonset/src/panel.rs.
// Changes here must be mirrored to the other two projects. // Changes here must be mirrored to the other two projects.
/// Maximum texture dimension for blur input. Textures larger than this are
/// downscaled before blurring — the blur destroys detail anyway, so there is /// downscaled before blurring — the blur destroys detail anyway, so there is
/// no visible quality loss, but GPU work is reduced significantly. /// no visible quality loss, but GPU work is reduced significantly.
const MAX_BLUR_DIMENSION: f32 = 1920.0; const MAX_BLUR_DIMENSION: f32 = 1920.0;
@@ -697,23 +650,84 @@ fn set_default_avatar(
image.set_icon_name(Some("avatar-default-symbolic")); image.set_icon_name(Some("avatar-default-symbolic"));
} }
/// Definition for a single power-action button (reboot, shutdown).
/// Couples icon, prompt, error text and action so a button cannot be wired
/// with a mismatched prompt/action pair. Mirrors moonset's `ActionDef`.
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct PowerAction {
icon_name: &'static str,
tooltip_attr: fn(&Strings) -> &'static str,
confirm_attr: fn(&Strings) -> &'static str,
error_attr: fn(&Strings) -> &'static str,
action_fn: fn() -> Result<(), PowerError>,
}
/// The power actions offered on the lockscreen.
fn power_actions() -> [PowerAction; 2] {
[
PowerAction {
icon_name: "system-reboot-symbolic",
tooltip_attr: |s| s.reboot_tooltip,
confirm_attr: |s| s.reboot_confirm,
error_attr: |s| s.reboot_failed,
action_fn: power::reboot,
},
PowerAction {
icon_name: "system-shutdown-symbolic",
tooltip_attr: |s| s.shutdown_tooltip,
confirm_attr: |s| s.shutdown_confirm,
error_attr: |s| s.shutdown_failed,
action_fn: power::shutdown,
},
]
}
/// Build a power-action icon button wired to the confirmation flow.
fn create_power_button(
action: PowerAction,
strings: &'static Strings,
power_box: &gtk::Box,
confirm_area: &gtk::Box,
confirm_box: &Rc<RefCell<Option<gtk::Box>>>,
error_label: &gtk::Label,
) -> gtk::Button {
let button = gtk::Button::new();
button.set_icon_name(action.icon_name);
button.add_css_class("power-button");
button.set_tooltip_text(Some((action.tooltip_attr)(strings)));
button.connect_clicked(clone!(
#[weak]
power_box,
#[weak]
confirm_area,
#[strong]
confirm_box,
#[weak]
error_label,
move |_| {
show_power_confirm(action, strings, &power_box, &confirm_area, &confirm_box, &error_label);
}
));
button
}
/// Show inline power confirmation. /// Show inline power confirmation.
fn show_power_confirm( fn show_power_confirm(
message: &'static str, action: PowerAction,
action_fn: fn() -> Result<(), PowerError>,
error_message: &'static str,
strings: &'static Strings, strings: &'static Strings,
power_box: &gtk::Box,
confirm_area: &gtk::Box, confirm_area: &gtk::Box,
confirm_box: &Rc<RefCell<Option<gtk::Box>>>, confirm_box: &Rc<RefCell<Option<gtk::Box>>>,
error_label: &gtk::Label, error_label: &gtk::Label,
) { ) {
dismiss_power_confirm(confirm_area, confirm_box); dismiss_power_confirm(confirm_area, confirm_box);
error_label.set_visible(false);
let new_box = gtk::Box::new(gtk::Orientation::Vertical, 8); let new_box = gtk::Box::new(gtk::Orientation::Vertical, 8);
new_box.set_halign(gtk::Align::Center); new_box.set_halign(gtk::Align::Center);
new_box.set_margin_top(16); new_box.set_margin_top(16);
let confirm_label = gtk::Label::new(Some(message)); let confirm_label = gtk::Label::new(Some((action.confirm_attr)(strings)));
confirm_label.add_css_class("confirm-label"); confirm_label.add_css_class("confirm-label");
new_box.append(&confirm_label); new_box.append(&confirm_label);
@@ -723,6 +737,8 @@ fn show_power_confirm(
let yes_btn = gtk::Button::with_label(strings.confirm_yes); let yes_btn = gtk::Button::with_label(strings.confirm_yes);
yes_btn.add_css_class("confirm-yes"); yes_btn.add_css_class("confirm-yes");
yes_btn.connect_clicked(clone!( yes_btn.connect_clicked(clone!(
#[weak]
power_box,
#[weak] #[weak]
confirm_area, confirm_area,
#[strong] #[strong]
@@ -730,8 +746,7 @@ fn show_power_confirm(
#[weak] #[weak]
error_label, error_label,
move |_| { move |_| {
dismiss_power_confirm(&confirm_area, &confirm_box); execute_power_action(action, strings, &power_box, &confirm_area, &confirm_box, &error_label);
execute_power_action(action_fn, error_message, &error_label);
} }
)); ));
button_row.append(&yes_btn); button_row.append(&yes_btn);
@@ -762,28 +777,44 @@ fn dismiss_power_confirm(confirm_area: &gtk::Box, confirm_box: &Rc<RefCell<Optio
} }
} }
/// Execute a power action in a background thread. /// Execute a power action in a background thread, guarding against re-trigger.
fn execute_power_action( fn execute_power_action(
action_fn: fn() -> Result<(), PowerError>, action: PowerAction,
error_message: &'static str, strings: &'static Strings,
power_box: &gtk::Box,
confirm_area: &gtk::Box,
confirm_box: &Rc<RefCell<Option<gtk::Box>>>,
error_label: &gtk::Label, error_label: &gtk::Label,
) { ) {
dismiss_power_confirm(confirm_area, confirm_box);
let action_fn = action.action_fn;
let error_message = (action.error_attr)(strings);
// Desensitize the power buttons so a double-click or keyboard repeat cannot
// fire the same action twice while it is in flight.
power_box.set_sensitive(false);
glib::spawn_future_local(clone!( glib::spawn_future_local(clone!(
#[weak]
power_box,
#[weak] #[weak]
error_label, error_label,
async move { async move {
let result = gio::spawn_blocking(move || action_fn()).await; let result = gio::spawn_blocking(action_fn).await;
match result { match result {
Ok(Ok(())) => {} Ok(Ok(())) => {}
Ok(Err(e)) => { Ok(Err(e)) => {
log::error!("Power action failed: {e}"); log::error!("Power action failed: {e}");
error_label.set_text(error_message); error_label.set_text(error_message);
error_label.set_visible(true); error_label.set_visible(true);
power_box.set_sensitive(true);
} }
Err(_) => { Err(_) => {
log::error!("Power action panicked"); log::error!("Power action panicked");
error_label.set_text(error_message); error_label.set_text(error_message);
error_label.set_visible(true); error_label.set_visible(true);
power_box.set_sensitive(true);
} }
} }
} }
+20 -2
View File
@@ -75,9 +75,12 @@ fn activate_with_session_lock(
// Shared unlock callback — unlocks session and quits. // Shared unlock callback — unlocks session and quits.
// Guard prevents double-unlock if PAM and fingerprint succeed simultaneously. // Guard prevents double-unlock if PAM and fingerprint succeed simultaneously.
let lock_clone = lock.clone(); let lock_clone = lock.clone();
let app_clone = app.clone();
let already_unlocked = Rc::new(Cell::new(false)); let already_unlocked = Rc::new(Cell::new(false));
let au = already_unlocked.clone(); let au = already_unlocked.clone();
// unlock() only. The library destroys the lock windows itself when the lock ends,
// and the ::unlocked handler quits the app afterwards. Calling app.quit() here too
// double-destroyed the windows (their surface was already gone) and segfaulted
// gtk_window_destroy. Matches the upstream gtk4-session-lock example.
let unlock_callback: Rc<dyn Fn()> = Rc::new(move || { let unlock_callback: Rc<dyn Fn()> = Rc::new(move || {
if au.get() { if au.get() {
log::debug!("Unlock already triggered, ignoring duplicate"); log::debug!("Unlock already triggered, ignoring duplicate");
@@ -85,7 +88,6 @@ fn activate_with_session_lock(
} }
au.set(true); au.set(true);
lock_clone.unlock(); lock_clone.unlock();
app_clone.quit();
}); });
// Shared caches for multi-monitor — first monitor renders, rest reuse // Shared caches for multi-monitor — first monitor renders, rest reuse
@@ -147,6 +149,16 @@ fn activate_with_session_lock(
} }
)); ));
// Quit only after the library finishes unlocking (::unlocked fires after the lock
// ends). gtk4-session-lock destroys the lock windows itself at lock-end; quitting
// earlier — or destroying windows ourselves — races that teardown and segfaults
// gtk_window_destroy on an already-gone surface. Mirrors the upstream example.
lock.connect_unlocked(glib::clone!(
#[weak]
app,
move |_| app.quit()
));
lock.lock(); lock.lock();
// Async fprintd initialization — runs after windows are visible // Async fprintd initialization — runs after windows are visible
@@ -250,11 +262,17 @@ fn setup_logging() {
eprintln!("Failed to create journal logger: {e}"); eprintln!("Failed to create journal logger: {e}");
} }
} }
// Debug level is only selectable in debug builds. Release binaries ignore
// MOONLOCK_DEBUG so a session script cannot escalate log verbosity to leak
// fprintd / D-Bus internals into the journal.
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
let level = if std::env::var("MOONLOCK_DEBUG").is_ok() { let level = if std::env::var("MOONLOCK_DEBUG").is_ok() {
log::LevelFilter::Debug log::LevelFilter::Debug
} else { } else {
log::LevelFilter::Info log::LevelFilter::Info
}; };
#[cfg(not(debug_assertions))]
let level = log::LevelFilter::Info;
log::set_max_level(level); log::set_max_level(level);
} }